Winning with the Hit and Run
By Will Kolodzie
© 2004, somworld.com
The “Hit and Run” isn’t a major strategy in the game of
baseball today. Most teams average less
than one attempt per game. Some of the
“slower” teams like the Boston Red Sox have an average of something like one
attempt per every three games.
Many Strat customers desire a greater role for this option
in the computer baseball game – whether in terms of design or enhanced
realism. Whether the
company ever redesigns this rule remains debatable. They receive a number of e-mails regarding
possible enhancements. The amount of
feedback elaborating the faults of the current system remains scarce. In other words, they need a better idea of
the problems before they can attempt a solution.
In the meantime, revisiting the current super-advanced chart
may provide a number of additional strategies and innovations that enhance game
play, and potentially, increase winning percentages. The super advanced charts contain a wealth of
information, sometimes obscured by a strict reliance on the computer product.
Strat-O-Matic has three basic designations for “hit and run”
ability. Situations with the infield or
corners in or holding a runner on base, creates a
fourth rating or instances where player ability increases by one grade. For example, a player with a “B” hit and run
rating becomes an “A” in instances where the defensive
manager has placed his corners “in.”
The value of the Hit and Run play doesn’t necessarily arise
from generating a base hit. The Super
Advanced chart features fewer hits than typically arise on a majority of player
cards.
Hit Chances
A – 8 of 36
B – 7 of 36
C – 5 of 36
D – 3 of 36
The higher hit and run designations do provide a good
measure of advancing base runners, particularly for those player cards without
a sufficient level of hit and on-base chances, but also as a means of avoiding
double plays.
Base Advancement Chances
A – 23 of 36
B –
21 of 36
C –
16 of 36
D –
07 of 36
A player with a
high number of double plays may benefit from the hit and run strategy, perhaps
if only to avoid ending an inning.
The hit and run
strategy does not require the assumption that the offense requires the
advancement of base runners either.
The “Strat” ball theories, perhaps using the rule as a means of
obtaining more hit chances, also factor into its utilization at a given point
during a game. There are a
limited number of hitter cards in a given set that can benefit from this chart,
particularly those players with limited at-bats for a team.
The Pitcher Cards
While the value of the hit and run assists in avoiding potential double play
situations and promotes the advancement of base runners, one of the largest
benefits of this strategy consists in the changes that occur on the pitcher
cards.
The Super Advanced rule disregards four specific readings
from the pitcher cards – strikeout, walk, single, and double.
This means that the hit and run strategy minimizes the
effect of the strikeout pitcher, such as the 2002 Randy Johnson or the 2003
Kerry Wood or Eric Gagne cards.
In other words, using the hit and run against the high
strikeout pitchers represents a very positive strategy, much more so than
employing the strategy against the Mark Mulder or Jamie Moyer “control”
pitchers.
The Super Advanced rule transfigures a large portion of the
Kerry Wood or Eric Gagne card. The rule
has a minimal effect on the non-strikeout pitchers like a Kenny Rogers.
To illustrate the point:
The 2003 Eric Gagne card has 75 strikeout chances against right-handed
hitters. The game rules modify these
chances into groundball (1b) C chances for any hitters with an “A” or “B” hit
and run rating.
The Super Advanced rule also modifies “walk” readings into
groundball (1b) C chances. Gagne has 3
walk chances on his card, creating a total of 78 base advancements
opportunities as a whole.
Using the hit and run strategy for a matchup between
Jermaine Clark and Gagne presents the following options.
Employing the hit and run strategy with
In contrast, the pitcher cards containing multiple walk
chances may not reflect an appropriate engagement of a hit and run
opportunity. The Super Advanced rules,
converting walk chances into groundball (2b) C instances may severely impact
the on-base capabilities of the offensive team.
Here, the situation dictates the following question: Am I better off trying to get a walk in this
situation, possibly increasing the number of base runners, or should I attempt
advancing the base runner at the expense of an out? This answer to this question may depend on
the subsequent hitters in the lineup.
Hitter Card Considerations
Using the hit and run successfully also requires a
consideration of the hitter card composition – not just the rule modifications
affecting the pitcher card.
The hit and run strategy must represent the best option in
terms of probability and/or strategy.
Otherwise, there’s no reason for engaging in the activity.
Basically, the hit and run strategy necessitates several
player traits.
1. Limited number of
hit and on-base chances.
2. Limited ability
regarding sacrifice bunts.
3. High potential for
hitting into a double play.
After all, there’s little pressure for using the hit and run
strategy with the All-Star caliber players of a set. Taking away hitter cards with positive hit
and on-base chances diminishes offensive production. The success opportunities for a sacrifice
bunt may produce greater returns.
Players with few or zero groundball (if) A
opportunities don’t require such strategy measures. Their cards already contain the readings
necessary for advancing base runners.
An examination of the 2003 Edgar Renteria card confirms the
second proposition. Renteria advances a
base runner a minimum 24 out of 36 chances during infield normal situations, a
minimum 27 out of 36 chances throughout situations of the infield (or corners)
“in” by the defensive manager.
Assuming one wishes to advance a base runner with the 2003
Renteria card at the plate, the sacrifice bunt accomplishes this task more
effectively than the hit and run strategy, at least on a majority of
circumstances.
In fact, a majority of players have a bunt rating equal to
or greater than their hit and run markings.
The 2003 St. Louis Cardinals, for instance, have only a single player,
Scott Rolen, with a higher hit and run rating.
The 2003 Padres have 7 players, but this team represents the higher end
of the spectrum. Most of Strat-O-Matic’s
ratings totals fall in between these two numbers.
Finding a substantial number of players with better hit and
run ratings, however, doesn’t fully tell the story. These cases must also balance the number of
hit chances allotted per card.
Shawn Green has a “B” hit and run rating for situations
where the defensive manager brings in the infield or corners. Green also has 20.3 and 25.7 hit chances on
the two sides of his card, making such occasions very limited. There’s little point in using the hit and
run strategy with a player such as Green who offers a more valuable weapon from
his own card results.
The most optimal situation consists in finding hitting cards
that meet all three considerations.
Unfortunately, this strategy reflects more of a “Stratball” mindset than
anything else.
The 2003 Craig Paquette card has 0 hit and on base chances
against left-handed pitchers. He has 34
double play chances and a “B” rating with the infield “in” by the defensive
manager. The hit and run is probably
the “only” strategy that might work in these situations.
In actuality, though one may wish to employ the hit and run
strategy more frequently, the number of player cards meeting the three primary
conditions, not to mention the number of instances arising for the tactic,
creates a very limited set of circumstances.
Furthermore, the influence of hitter and pitcher card
considerations into the hit and run strategy contains a limited number of
possibilities given Strat-O-Matic’s ratings distribution.
Stolen Base Ability
What every offensive manager should note concerns the players with a better hit
and run rating as compared to sacrifice bunt ability. These players present the “prime” hit and
run options. All of the previous
considerations change with the “C” and “D” hit and run ratings because of the
“BMP” (batter misses pitch) game rule.
Most managers probably don’t entertain hit and run
considerations given the presence of these ratings.
BMP
A – 06 of 36 chances
B – 08 of 36 chances
C – 12 of 36 chances
D – 20 of 36 chances
The “C” hit and run rating contains the possibility of 16
base running chances and 12 “BMP” readings.
The “D” ratings produce 7 base running chances and 20 “BMP” readings.
Moreover, the strikeout pitchers don’t see their strikeout
chances converted into groundball (1b) C readings. The “C” and “D” hit and run ratings
transform the pitcher strikeout numbers into “BMP” readings.
For instance, the Eric Gagne pitching card has 78 “BMP”
readings, not groundball (1b) C ones in cases for the “C” and “D” reading.
This means a player card like Richie Sexson (D) has a high
possibility of the BMP reading when facing Eric Gagne in a hit and run
situation. Basically, the manager
commits the base runner to a steal attempt on a high number of occasions.
This is a problematic situation unless the base runner
achieves a “good” lead.
Rule 19.8 outlines the essential basics of the decision.
19.8 When using the Supplementary Stealing system and the result of the
Hit and Run is "batter misses pitch ..." roll to determine whether
the lead base runner achieved his "good
lead" only if the base runner had not already
attempted to do so before the hit and run was employed. He does not get a
second attempt at a "good lead."
Even if the lead runner does not achieve a good lead, he must attempt to
steal. If this turns out to be men at first and second bases attempting a
double‑steal, the catcher's throw is for the lead runner.
Here, attempting a hit and run with
a “C” and “D” rated player card requires getting a good lead for the base
runner, at least in the effort for maximizing the success of this option. Otherwise, the offensive manager is giving an
“out” away to the opposition.
Using the hit and run with Vernon
Wells (3-1 steal numbers) rarely makes sense.
Section 19.8 only adds to the difficulties of employing the
hit and run option. Lower proficiency
players work in conjunction with player cards possessing good stolen base
ability.
Winning with the hit and run strategy doesn’t necessarily
hold as a futile effort. Nonetheless,
this strategy requires serious thinking about the alternatives and options
present at a particular time in the game.
For the most part, the “hit and run” represents more of a gimmick or
“Stratball” device than a serious strategy concern that occupies serious
standing in any managerial computations.
Review
Use the hit and run strategy with “A” and “B” ratings against the strikeout
pitcher. The Super Advanced rule
penalizes this pitcher type more than any other type of card. Avoid engaging in this strategy with “C” and
“D” ratings.
Check the percentages for the sacrifice bunt before
factoring the hit and run possibilities.
Employ the hit and run using hitters with high double play
chances and limited hit chances.
Always check the stolen base ability of a base runner before
making a decision about employing this option.
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